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The effect of social motives, communication and group size
on behaviour in an N-person multi-stage mixed-motive game*
WIM B. G. LIEBRAND
Department of Psychology,
University of Groningen,
9712 HV Groningen. The Netherlands
Abstract
Two experiments investigated the impact of social motives or individuals' preferences
for specific self–other outcome distributions, on behaviour in an n-person game.
Subjects' social motives (altruistic, cooperative, individualistic, competitive) were
assessed prior to the decision-making in either 7-person games (Experiment 1) or
20-person games (Experiment 2). A modification of the n-person game format
normally employed is introduced in this research to permit the choices made by
players on a given trial to modify the payoff matrix available to self and others on
subsequent trials. The game format, a simulated social dilemma, was presented in
terms of a conservation of resources problem. In Experiment 1 communication
opportunities were manipulated.
As predicted, there were consistent differences between the four classes of social
motivation in the amount of the resources taken for self: competitive subjects took the
most, individualistic subjects took less than the competitive ones but more than the
average, while cooperative and altruistic subjects took the smallest amount of the
resources for themselves. Moreover, competitive subjects expected the others to take
fewer resources than they intended to themselves, and altruistic subjects expected the
others to take more resources than they intended to themselves. These findings are
only partly consistent with existing theories concerning the relationship between
behaviour and expected behaviour of others.
In addition, when communication was allowed, significantly fewer resources were
taken for self. Contrary to the predictions based on previous research findings,
subjects in the 20-person groups did not take more resources for self than subjects in
the 7-person groups.
INTRODUCTION
Human decision-making often occurs in settings where the choices of two or more
interdependent actors have strong implications both for their own and other's
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outcomes. A formalization of the structural properties of one such type of
interdependence can be found in prior conceptual and empirical studies of n-person
games. Substantively, the conservation of resources or social dilemma paradigm
defines an important class of settings which possess the structural properties of such
decisional interdependence. This paradigm has been characterized by Hardin
(1968), Messick and Brewer (1983), Olson (1965), Platt (1973) and others as one
in which the immediate self-interest of decision makers is in conflict with their
collective long-term interest.
The present research attempts in two ways to extend prior research which has
employed n-person games to examine the resource conservation dilemma. First, it
employs a decision task which is dynamic. Second, it assesses the effect of social
motive in a dynamic decision task in which the structural factors communication
and group size are manipulated.
A DYNAMIC DECISION TASK
A modification of the n-person game format normally employed is introduced in
this research to permit the choices made by players on a given trial to modify the
payoff matrix available to self and others on subsequent trials. Prior empirical
research using traditional n-person games like the Prisoner's Social Dilemma and
the Chicken Social Dilemma (Caldwell, 1976; Dawes, McTavish and Shaklee,
1977; Kelley and Grzelak, 1972; Komorita, Sweeney and Kravitz, 1980; Meux,
1973) have presented subjects with binary choices between alternatives that afford
either a moderate payoff that does not damage the collective interest, or a high
payoff that entails some cost to all subjects. In these studies the numerical
outcomes attached to each alternative are fixed over the trials of the game. Findings
obtained in such studies are consistent with the hypothesis that, in small face to face
groups (5 to 13 members) which make choices without communication with one
another, the majority of members select the alternative that serves to maximize
their own short-term interests at the expense of the long-term interest of the group
of which they are a member.
Although there are strong similarities between the structural properties of the
choice dilemma established in the preceding studies and those operating in actual
conservation of resource situations, there is also an important dissimilarity.
Namely, in the n-person games noted above, the decisions by actors on any given
trial do not change the resources available on subsequent trials. In most real-life
conservation of resource situations, of course, the situation is more dynamic. There,
the outcomes produced by decisions at time t influence the size of the pool of
resources available at time t + 1.
There are several studies of conservation of resource dilemmas (Brechner, 1977;
Messick et al., 1983; Stern, 1976) using simulated dilemma situations which are not
formally conceptualized as n-person games, but which permit the total resources
available on each trial to vary as a function of subjects' prior choices and/or some
form of experimenter intervention. That is, in a manner similar to many dilemmas
in the 'real world', the interdependent decisions of actors not only influence the
distribution of outcomes available at the time of choice, but also the outcomes
available subsequently. In Dawes' (1980) terminology these games are called
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'variabie games'. These studies report that changes in the outcomes available
through time can influence players' decisional strategies. Hence, in the present
study subjects are afforded the opportunity to make choices in a multi-stage
n-person mixed-motive game, which we have called the Sequence Dilemma
(Liebrand, 1982).
The Sequence Dilemma (SD) differs from the n-person games mentioned above
in that there are more than two decisional alternatives at each stage and the
decisions made at a particular stage influence the remaining resources, and hence
the range of outcomes available on subsequent stages. The SD differs from the
conservation of resource dilemmas in that subjects are provided information
concerning the amount of resources left for the remaining stages. This property
enabies the subjects to derive an expected payoff at each decision point during the
whole game. Although being in part a departure from the reality of many resource
decisions, such feedback makes the present task analogous to prior n-person social
dilemma games.
THE ASSESSMENT OF SOCIAL MOTIVATION
As second extension of prior resource conservation research, the present study
considers the way in which the own-other outcome decision matrices presented by
the experimenter are actually experienced by individual subjects. Kelley and
Thibaut (1978) point out that the outcome matrix presented by an experimenter,
which may be described as the given matrix, may not be the one on which the
decisions of the actors are based. Rather one can expect actors to differentially
transform the given matrix cell entries according to the personal values they place
on the alternative own–other outcome distributions (cf. Kelley and Thibaut, 1978;
McClintock, 1972, 1978). Kelley and Thibaut describe this process as one of
moving from a given to an effective matrix. Kuhlman and Marshello (1975a, b)
demonstrate that systematic differences in choices to a given matrix are made by
subjects identified a priori as being cooperative, individualistic or competitive in
social motivation. Hence, the second major extension of prior research involves a
prior assessment of the preferences of actors for specific outcome distributions.
That is, the specific social motivation of each subject is assessed prior to their
participating in the Sequence Dilemma task, so as to provide a basis for examining
the subsequent transformational process.
Structural mechanisms that affect decision-making
Among the structural mechanisms capable of affecting decision-making in dilemma
situations, the effect of communication and group size has been weIl established
(Dawes, 1980). In reviewing several studies, Dawes (1980) points out that the
salutary effects of communication on group oriented decision-making are
ubiquitous. When, subjects were allowed to discuss the dilemma problem
(Bixenstine, Levitt and Wilson, 1966; Brechner, 1977) or when in addition to that
type of discussion, they were allowed to elicit or extort commitments about each
others' behaviour, cooperation rates increased substantively (Caldwell, 1976;
Dawes et al., 1977).
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Prior research, however, has not been directed to a possibie communication by
social motivation interaction. For example, being confronted with an opinion from
others may be more effective in promoting cooperative behaviour for subjects with
a cooperative social motivation than for those more individualistically or
competitively motivated, who might use the information in a self-interested or
exploitative manner. In the first experiment reported here, communication
opportunity is manipulated, since subjects in one condition are permitted to discuss
the dilemma problem, and in another no communication is allowed.
Group size, the second structural mechanism, has also been found to be an
important factor in determining the probable amount of cooperative behaviour in
n-person dilemma tasks. With Olson (1965) and Messick (1973) one can assume
that with increasing group size, both the individual's share of responsibility for
exhausting or conserving the resources decreases and the perception of relative
anonimity increases. Hence, in larger groups persons should feel less constraint
against behaving in a self-interested way for the short term. Prior studies assessing
the effect of group size indeed do report somewhat less cooperation in larger
groups (Bixenstine et al., 1966; Bonacich, Shure, Kahan and Meeker, 1976;
Hamburger, Guyer and Fox, 1975; Komorita and Lapworth, 1982; Marwell and
Schmidt, 1972). However, in these studies the range of group size is relatively small
(up to nine persons). The present study attempts to more closely approximate and
examine those processes which Olson and Messick describe as obtaining in resource
dilemmas in larger groups. More specifically, the behaviour of seven person groups
(Experiment 1) is compared with that of twenty person groups (Experiment 2).
Dependent measures: own decisional behaviour; expectations about others
Studies on game behaviour (Kelley and Stahelski, 1970; Kuhlman and Wimberley,
1976) have shown that in interdependent situations, own decisional behaviour
covaries with the expectations about the decisional behaviour of others. In the
present study the dependent variables consist of the strategy and choices actually
made by subjects in the Sequence Dilemma, and their expectations concerning the
decisional behaviour of others. The specific predictions made as regards how the
dependent variables will vary as a function of the subject's social motivation and
the two manipulated structural variables, communication and group size, will be
described at the beginning of each study. First, however, the following will be
described: (a) the decision-making task, namely the Sequence Dilemma; and (b)
the procedure for assessing individual differences in social motivation.
The Sequence Dilemma
In the experimental task, the Sequence Dilemma, there are five decision stages. At
each stage, each subject can take between $1.50 and $9.00 from a common pool of
resources. Further, subjects make their choices in private and are then informed
about the total amount of resources consumed. Before making choices at any given
stage, the experimenter announces the total amount of money chosen by subjects in
the prior stages. In following these procedures, the resources consumed individually
by subjects remain unknown to the other players. If the total amount requested by
the players at the end of the five stages is greater than the initial pool size, each














Figure 1. Possible outcomes for the Sequence Dilemma for 7 persons given 5
stages where the minimal amount of money for each person per stage is
$1.50; the maximum $9.00. (a) cumulative minimal amount of money across
choosers at each stage; (c) cumulative maximal amount of money across
choosers; (b) possible cumulation curve. So„,: lowest resource pool size; Shigh:
highest resource pool size
subject receives nothing. If it is less, then each person gets the amount he or she
requested.
The size of the total resource pool, or the total amount of money available is not
fixed. Subjects are informed that there are five different pool sizes and that which
one of these is their pool is randomly determined after choices have been made at
all five stages. The sizes of the five total resource pools fall in between the extremes
set by players choosing consistently the maximum amount of money for self at each
stage, and their choosing consistently the minimal amount of money (see Figure 1).
Since subjects are fully informed on all the constraints, they are confronted with the
following dilemma. Choosing much money for self, which is the most-threatening
strategy, can result in high earnings. However, if everybody does so, all five limits
will be exceeded, and the earnings will equal zero. Hence, behaving in a
self-interested way in the short term has a negative impact on both self and the
common interest in the long run.
The Sequence Dilemma can be regarded as a multi-stage generalization of the
Take Some Games discussed by Hamburger (1974, 1979) and Liebrand (1983). As
Hamburger points out, the strategic properties of a Take Some Game can be
derived by considering the probability distribution of the pool size at any given
stage of decision-making. To illustrate this point, an analysis of the strategic
properties of the procedures used in Experiment 1 is provided. In Experiment 1,
each of 7 players could choose at each stage options worth either $1.50 or $9.00 or
some amount in between. There were five stages and five equally spaced resource
pool sizes, the lowest being $95, the highest $115. Each pool size had a probability
of 0.2 of being drawn (see Figure 1). Consider any single player, say player A.
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expected average amount of money
chosen by the other
Figure 2. Payoff functions in Sequence Dilemma (Experiment 1) for two strategies by player A
and by others
the amount of money chosen with certainty, provided that on the average the other
six persons would choose the same amount of money. Player A must then choose
$13.50 across the 5 stages. Asking for $13.50 will result in a total that is below the
lowest pool size and therefore, given that others have made similar choices, player
A would always receive $13.50. A second strategy might be to achieve an equal
share of the average pool size which is $105. This strategy therefore prescribes each
player asking for $15.00 across stages. If this $15.00 strategy is used by all players
there is a chance that the pool size to be drawn will be exceeded since the $95 and
the $100 sizes are below the total amount chosen. The probability of getting a
payoff with the $15.00 strategy is then 0.6, being the probability that the pool size
will be $105, $110, or $115.
Thus far, the amount of money chosen by the others was considered identical to
the amount for player A. Varying the amount of money chosen by the others yields
an expected payoff function for each of the two above strategies (see Figure 2). It is
apparent from Figure 2 that the more is chosen by the other players, the lower the
expected payoff of player A will be. By assuming that others picking higher
amounts is less preferred by player A, it is possible to describe preference orderings
among expected payoffs. If, given player A's $13.50 and $15.00 strategies, A
believes that the average amount to be chosen by others is either $13.00 or $14.00,
the preference ordering of expected payoffs for player A is identical to a Prisoner's
Dilemma preference ordering (Table 1). By varying player A's strategies as well as
the pair considered equally likely regarding the expected average choice of the
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Table 1. Prisoner's Dilemma preference
ordering for player A (best possible outcome
(1), worst possible outcome (4)), given two
strategies by player A and by others
Others
Player A $13.00 $14.00
`Ask for $13.50' 2 4
'Ask for $15.00' 1 3
other players, a different family of games (Hamburger et al., 1975) can be
constructed.
It follows from the above analysis that the combination of own strategy and the
expectations about the behaviour of the other players is important in determining
the player's perception of the structure of the game. It is also evident that the
structure of a game depends on the specific stage of decision-making since with
each successive stage more information is released to players. Therefore, the
transformation process from the given matrix into the effectave matrix is expected
to depend on personal influences like own strategy and expectations concerning
others' strategies, as well as contextual influences like the increasing information on
the amount of resources that have been expended.
Individual differences in social motivation
In the definition and measurement of social motivation, it is assumed that each
motivation has its own utility function as determined by the linear combination of
own and others' outcomes (Wyer, 1969; Griesinger and Livingston, 1973). That is,
differential weighting of the two components, own and others' outcomes, yields
various utility functions. Using this procedure, a geometric taxonomy defining
various social motives was devised by Griesinger and Livingston (1973).
In this geometric model, the utility functions are represented as motivational
vectors of infinite length extending from the origin of a two-dimensional space
defined by the outcomes to self (horizontal axis) and the outcomes to the other
(vertical axis). Given two self–other outcomes defined as points in this space,
players are assumed to choose the outcome with the greatest projection on their
preferred motivational vector. For example, as can be seen in Figure 3, a player
with a motivational vector with slope –1 in quadrant 4, prefers the outcome 4 units
to self and 2 units to the other (S) to the outcome which affords both players 4
units (R). Consistent with existing literature, four classes of social motivations are
distinguished in the present study: altruism: the motivation to maximize other's
outcomes; cooperation: the motivation to maximize the sum of own and other's
outcomes; individualism: the motivation to maximize own outcomes; and
competition: the motivation to maximize the difference between own and other's
outcomes (see Figure 3).
To assess which motivational vector is dominant for a particular individual,
various measurement techniques using Decomposed Games (Messick and
McClintock, 1968; Pruitt, 1967) have been proposed (Griesinger and Livingston,
t'3
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altruistic
92	ether 's 5	 9 1
outcome
Figure 3. Own—other outcome space. q 1 to q4 = quadrant 1 to quadrant 4
1973; Kuhlman and Marshello, 1975b). The subjects' task in a Decomposed Game
is to select out of n own–other outcome distributions their most preferred one.
Each distribution affords a certain payoff to the subject and to some other player.
Generally, the other player remains unknown to the subject to avoid considerations
of strategy. The payoffs for each distributional option can be represented as a point
in the own–other outcome space, and subjects are expected to choose outcomes
with the greatest projection on their preferred motivational vector. Confronting
subjects with a series of Decomposed Games, using different combinations of
outcomes, provides a measure to determine the direction . of the subject's preferred
vector. The Decomposed Games procedure used to assess social motives in the
present study is derived from the procedure originally proposed by Griesinger and
Livingston (1973). However, if order to avoid the on-line computer connection
required by their procedure, a straightforward paper and pencil version to be
described in the Procedure section was developed.
Behaviour in the Sequence Dilemma and social motivation
Since the amount of money available in the Sequence Dilemma is restricted, there
exists a strong interdependency between the outcomes of the persons involved. The
outcome of the game depends on a combination of own strategy and the behaviour
of the other players, and hence a chooser is likely to consider others' probabie
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choices in making his or her own. Therefore, two dependent variables are added to
the main dependent variable, which is subject's resource choices. These two
variabies provide an indication of a subject's relative position in his or her
decision-making group. The first variable, relative strategy, consists of the total
amount of resources, a subject is planning to choose across stages (i.e. subject's own
strategy), minus the average of his or her expectation of others' strategies. The
second variable, relative choice, consists of the choices actually made minus the
average of the choices actually made by the others in that decision-making group.
Starting with Kelley and Stahelski (1970), attention has been given to
interpersonal differences in the relationship between own game behaviour and the
perception of others. Specifically, Kelley and Stahelski have shown that there exist
differences between persons who describe their own intentions as cooperative and
persons who describe themselves as competitive. Their triangle hypothesis states
that competitive players, in general, expect others to be competitive as well, while
cooperative players expect others to be either cooperative or competitive. Miller
and Holmes (1975) and Kuhlman and Wimberley (1976) were successful in
replicating and extending the Kelley and Stahelski findings in the traditional
two-person, two-choice Prisoner's Dilemma Game. For other classes of game
settings however, it appears that interpersonal differences do exist but not in the
specific pattern hypothesized by Kelley and Stahelski. The data from Kuhlman and
Wimberley (1976) and Ross, Greene and House (1977) suggest that, in the
absence of any base rate, the expected dominant social motive is that one preferred
by the person himself. According to this egocentric attribution perspective, players
would expect others to choose similar amounts of money in the Sequence Dilemma
as they choose for themselves.
In the present study the above model of attribution is considered to be too
restrictive since nearly complete base rate information is available to the subjects at
the end of the game. Here it may be expected that during the game, when more and
more information on others' behaviour becomes available, the subject's prediction
of the amount of resources chosen by the average other across stages, becomes
better and better. In the present study, therefore, it is predicted that in the process
of receiving more information, a subject will behave in a way corresponding to his
or her preference for the distribution of outcomes for self and others. Specifically, it
is predicted that before the last stage of decision-making, the subjects' predictions
of their relative position in the group (relative strategy) and the actual relative
choices across stages correspond to the subject's motivational vector in the
own–other outcome space: altruistic subjects willingly choose less than the average
other; cooperative subjects willingly choose about the same as the average other;
individualistic and competitive subjects willingly choose more than the average
other, the difference for the competitive subjects will be the greatest.
The above set of predictions is conditional upon the base rate information given
to the subjects. In case base rate information is not available, the egocentric model
of attribution is considered the appropriate model to describe the perception of
others. In case base rate information is available, a subjective expected utility
maximization model based on the self–other outcome space is considered the
appropriate model. It is obvious that neither model accounts both for situations in
which base rate information is available and for situations in which such
information is not available. In the present study both models were combined.
248	 Wim B. G. Liebrand
EXPERIMENT 1
In this experiment the influence of the subject's social motivation on the dependent
variables Own Resource Choices, Relative Strategy and Relative Choice, was
investigated in two experimental conditions. In one of these conditions, subjects
were permitted to discuss the dilemma problem. In the other no communication
was allowed. It was predicted that the non-communicating groups would request
more money than the communicating groups.
By means of the Decomposed Games technique subjects were classified a priori
as 'altruistic', 'cooperative', 'individualistic' or 'competitive'. It was predicted that
subjects classified as having a cooperative social motivation would choose about the
same amount of money for self that they expect others to choose; those classified as
altruistic would choose less than the cooperative ones, and moreover, less than they
expect others to do; those classified as individualistic or competitive both would
choose more than the cooperative subjects. Specifically, it was predicted that scores
on the variables, Own Recource Choice, Relative Choice, and Relative Strategy
before the last stage of decision-making, would increase for the classes 'altruism',
`cooperation', 'individualism', and 'competition' respectively. Furthermore it was
predicted that there would be no diferences between the four classes of social
motivation in their scores on the variable Relative Strategy before the first stage of
decision-making in the Sequence Dilemma.
Finally, the social motivation-by-communication interaction was investigated.
Subjects classified as 'cooperative' or 'altruistic' (group 1) were compared with
those classified as 'individualistic' or 'competitive' (group 2). It was predicted that
group 1 would be more compliant to the appeals made by others in the
communication condition than group 2.
Method
Subjects
Subjects, 132 volunteers (67 males, 65 females) responding to an advertisement in
a local newspaper in Groningen, the Netherlands, were randomly assigned to one
of 20 groups. Ten groups were in the communication condition; ten in the
non-communication condition. Since eight of the 140 scheduled subjects did not
show up, groups consisted of either six or seven persons. If the Sequence Dilemma
requirements were met, subjects received the total sum they had chosen; otherwise
they received a consolation payment of $1.50 per hour.
Procedure
Subjects, who were seated in cubicles during the first part of the session, received
instructions concerning the structure of the Decomposed Games, and then made
32 Decomposed Games choices. Thereafter, the instructions for the Sequence
Dilemma were presented, and a quiz was administered to ensure complete
understanding of this task. Once all the incorrect quiz-answers were explained, the
subjects were brought to a large (9 x 9 ft) table to participate in the second part of
the session. Subjects were seated behind a small screen which prohibited them from
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seeing each others' response sheets, while at the same time permitting them to see
each other. Throughout the session, subjects were assigned and then addressed
with a subject number ranging from 1 to 7.
Procedure for the Decomposed Games. The Decomposed Games technique
employed consisted of making 32 choices between two own–other outcome
combinations. The 32 pairs of outcomes lie either on a circle A or on a circle B in
the own–other outcome space depicted in Figure 3. The centre of both the circles
coincided with the origin of the outcome plane; the radius for circle A was $7.00
and $8.50 for circle B. There were 16 equally spaced pairs of outcomes on each
of the circles while each pair consisted of two adjacent own–other outcome
combinations. An example of such a pair is the choice between $3.30 for self and
$7.90 for the other versus $6.00 for self and $6.00 for the other. This pair of outcome
combinations is equivalent to the (A, c) versus (B, b) pair in Figure 4 when the
radius of the circle is $8.50. Out of the 32 pairs of outcomes for the two circles, the
subjects selected the pair of outcomes they preferred most.
Subjects were toid that the other person in the Decomposed Games was another
person whom they would never know. In the instructions the structure of the
Decomposed Games format was thoroughly explained by means of two examples,
but no advice was given on how to select the outcomes. Adding up the chosen
amounts separately for self and for other yields an estimate of the subject's
motivational vector. For example, suppose subject P's motivational vector is the
one depicted in Figure 4. For P the most preferred outcome is (C, a) and the least
(-A,-c)
--r0 -d)
Figure 4. Distribution of self–other outcomes choices for Decomposed
Games technique
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preferred outcome is (–C, – a). In selecting between (C, a) and the two adjacent
outcomes (B, b) and (D, o), the most preferred outcome will of course be (C, a). For
the remaining pairs of outcomes, the outcome with the shortest distance to (C, a)
will be chosen. Since any outcome has two adjacent outcomes, it is presented in two
different pairings of outcomes to the subject. In one and only one of these two
pairings this outcome has the shortest distance to the subject's preferred social
motive (C, a). Therefore, all the outcomes but (C, a) and ( – C, –a) should be
chosen just once, (C, a) will be chosen twice and (–C, –a) will never be chosen. As
noted above, the projections of the selected outcomes on the own- and on the
other-outcome axis are added up. If the subject is choosing consistently with a given
social motive all the selected outcomes, except (C, a) are cancelled by the one on
the opposite side on the circle. For example, (B, b) is cancelled by (–B, –b) and
(D, o) by ( –D, o). Since (C, a) was chosen twice, the resultant of the adding
procedure has twice the projection of (C, a) on the two axes, indicating the
direction of subject P's motivational vector.
Next, subjects were classified into one of four classes of social motivation, if the
percentage of choices identical with a consistent choice pattern according to one of
the four social motives exceeded 60 per cent. In that case all observed motivational
vectors in between degree 112.5 and 67.5 (Figure 3) were labelled altruistic, all
vectors in between degree 67.5 and 22.5 were labelled cooperative, all vectors in
between 22.5 and 337.5 were labelled individualistic, and all vectors in between
degree 337.5 and 292.5 were labelled competitive. In Experiment 1, 105 of the 132
subjects, and in Experiment 2, 94 of the 101 subjects (across experiments 85 per
cent) could thus be classified. The 60 per cent consistency level was used to
eliminate subjects who made their choices nearly randomly. Such a choice pattern
would have had a consistency level of about 50 per cent. The overall level of
consistency for Experiment 1 is 76 per cent for Experiment 2, 80 per cent.
Procedure for the Sequence Dilemma. The structure of the Sequence Dilemma
was explained in terms of a conservation of energy paradigm, in order to make the
abstract characteristics of the task both more concrete and more realistic. A
conservation of energy paradigm has the advantage that on the one hand there
exists uncertainty about the total amount of resources availabie, while on the other
hand, conservation of this resource is in general seen as desirabie.
Each of the persons made four anonymous pair-wise selections at each of five
stages. The options to be selected involved a certain consumption of energy which
was expressed in monetary units available to the subject: selection 1: using a
private car (yielding $3.00) versus public transport (yielding $.50); selection 2:
dishwasher ($3.00) versus no dishwasher ($.50); selection 3: colour TV set ($1.00)
versus black and white TV set ($.25); selection 4: laundry dryer ($2.00) versus no
laundry dryer ($.25). The minimum amount of energy used or alternatively the
minimum amount of money that each person could choose for self at each stage is
$1.50, the maximum amount is $9.00.
Subjects were told that the stages corresponded to a certain amount of time
(period) and that the total amount of energy resource (money) availabie across the
five periods would be $95, $100, $105, $110, or $115. For the six person groups
these pool sizes were adjusted to fall between $80 to $100, and subjects were
informed that each pool size had a probability of 0.2 to be drawn after all the
decisions had been made.
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Actually, the monetary units presented to the subjects were Dutch guilders.
These guilders are translated here into dollars (1 dollar = 2 guilders). Subjects
were told that they were making real money decisions and that they would be paid
the amount of money they had chosen for self, if the total amount chosen in their
group across stages had not exceeded the pool size drawn.
After each stage of decision-making, subjects were informed concerning the total
cumulative amount of money chosen. No information was given concerning the
cumulation of money by individual subjects. Prior to each stage, subjects had to
report in writing their own intended strategy: At this moment I expect to choose
across the stages $. . ., and their expectations about the intended strategy of each of
the other group members. Subsequently, they made their choice for that particular
stage.
Throughout the instructions, no reference was given to the desirability of
selecting particular options. In the non-communication conditon subjects were not
allowed to communicate. Subjects in the communication condition could discuss
the dilemma for 10 min before stage one, and for 5 min before each of the
remaining stages. There were no restrictions on the topics to be discuseed, as long
as the choices remained secret. Following the discussion, subjects privately filled
out a sheet containing questions on the strategy of each of the players and made
their choices for that particular stage of decision-making.
Results
Effects of communication and social motivation across stages
In 7 of the 10 decision-making groups within the communication condition, the
total amount of money chosen across stages was lower than the lowest possibie pool
size; the probability of getting the amount of money chosen in each of the
remaining groups was 0.8. In contrast, within the non-communication condition,
the lowest possible pool size was exceeded by all the groups. In addition, the
amount of money chosen in one of these groups exceeded the highest possibie pool
size; the remaining 9 groups in the non-communication condition had an average
probability of 0.54 to receive the amount of money chosen.
In the analysis of the effect of communication and social motivation on subject's
own resource choices, the differences between the 20 decision-making groups
(MS-A) and the groups by social motivation interaction (MS-AB), were considered
to be estimates of the experimental error in a partially hierarchical design (Winer,
1962, p. 184). Preliminary tests of the effect of MS-A and MS-AB yielded
insignificant F-ratios at the 0.10 level of significance. Consequently, MS-A and
MS-AB were combined with the within-cells estimate of experimental error to a
pooled error term. The final test yielded significant effects for communication (F(3,
97) = 4.61, p < 0.05), and for social motivation (F(3, 97) = 3.70, p < 0.05). The
social motivation by communication interaction effect accounted for virtually no
variance.
As appears from Table 2, subjects in the non-communicating groups requested
on the average $1.48 more across stages than the subjects in the communicating
groups. Though the overall effect of communication was huge, it appeared that
communication had about the same effect on each of the four classes of social
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Table 2. Own resource choices broken down for four classes of social motivation; number
of subjects within parentheses, 7-person groups Experiment 1
Altruistic Cooperative Individualistic Competitive Total
Communication not allowed (4) (26) (18) (5) (53)
Average resource choice 11.68 13.93 16.12 19.10 14.99
Communication allowed (1) (30) (15) (6) (52)
Average resource choice 10.75 13.09 13.83 15.33 13.51
Across conditions (5) (56) (33) (11) (105)
Average resource choice 11.50 13.48 15.08 17.04 14.26
motivation (see Tabie 2). Hence, the hypothesis concerning the social motivation by
communication interaction was not supported.
As can be seen from Tabie 2, social motivation affects the resource choices made
in the Sequence Dilemma in the predicted way. The resource choices made across
conditions increase from $11.50 for altruistic subjects, to $13.48 for cooperative
subjects, to $15.08 for individualistic subjects, and finally to $17.04 for competitive
subjects.
Social motivation; relative choice
In addition, the five relative choices made by each subject (see Figure 5) were
analysed in a repeated measures model with social motivation as the between
subjects factor. Using the sum of subject's relative choices as dependent variable, a

















Figure 5. Relative choices for four classes of social
motivation by stage in 7-person Sequence Dilemma; comp =
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Across stages, competitive and to a lesser degree individualistic subjects chose
more than the average other in their groups; altruistic and to a lesser degree
cooperative subjects chose less than the average other. An additional analysis, in
which the subject's five relative choices were used as dependent variables, yielded
no significant univariate or multivariate effects for the linear, quadratic, cubic and
quartic trends. As can be seen from Figure 5, there is no indication that
individualistic and to a greater extent competitive subjects tended to adapt to the
realities of running out towards the end of the game. On the contrary, throughout
the game they chose more than the average other in their group.
Social motivation; relative strategy
Next, the hypotheses concerning the relation between own behaviour and expected
behaviour from others were analysed. Prior to each stage of decision-making,
subjects made predictions concerning the cumulative amount of resources chosen
by self (own strategy) and by each of the other players (other's strategies). Both
variabies are depicted in Figure 6. Using as dependent variable the difference
between both variabies at stage 5, i.e. stage 5 relative strategy, a one-way analysis
of variance yielded a significant effect for the linear polynomial contrast
among the means of the four classes of social motivation (F(1, 78) = 4.99,
p < 0.05). The quadratic and cubic polynomial contrasts yielded insignificant effects.
In the analysis in which stage 1 relative strategy served as dependent variable, none   
self
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Figure 6. Own strategy and expected strategy of others, by stage in 7-person
Sequence Dilemma; broken down for social motive
254	 Wim B. G. Liebrand
of the polynomial contrasts yielded significant effects. It was concluded that the pat-
tern of relative strategies fits the predicted one.
Next, the accuracy of subject's predictions concerning own and other's resource
choices was analysed. Because group specific constants, such as a high or low
resource depletion, do not have any effect on the variables relative strategy and
relative choice across stages, the correlation between both variables was considered
to be an indication of subject's accuracy. The Pearson correlation coefficients
between relative strategy and relative choice across stages, gradually increased
from 0.21 (stage 1) to 0.55 (stage 5). The results support the conclusion that the
feedback given during the game, was effective in increasing the accuracy of
subject's perception of other's choice behaviour. Hence, it was concluded that
subjects very likely were aware of the differences between their own resource
choices and those of others in their group.
Effect of feedback
The overall effect of feedback about others' choice behaviour on subject's
subsequent choice appeared to be negligible. For the communication condition the
Pearson correlations were, stage 2: –0.05; stage 3: 0.05; stage 4: –0.22; stage 5:
– 0.25 (p < 0.05). For the non-communication condition, stage 2: 0.16; stage 3:
–
0.04; stage 4: –0.13; stage 5: 0.08. It is concluded that feedback about others'
choice behaviour apparently creates a conflict between tendencies to cooperate and
tendencies to defect (cf. Messick and Brewer, 1983).
Effects of communication and sex per stage
The amount of money chosen as a function of communication, sex and stage of
decision-making is shown in Figure 7. The five resource choices made by each
subject were analysed as repeated measures (Finn and Mattson, 1978), with
communication and sex as the two between subjects factors and stages as the within
subjects factor. In this analysis the data of the subjects which could not be classified
into one of the classes of social motivation (n = 27; see procedure section) were
included. The analysis yielded significant univariate effects for the linear, quadratic
and cubic trends; the quartic trend was not significant. In addition significant
multivariate effects were obtained for the first three polynomials taken together
(F(3, 126) = 33.73, p < 0.05), and for the polynomials by communication
interaction (F(3, 126) = 15.73, p < 0.05).
The polynomials by communication interaction was analysed by comparing the
proportion of the total effect variance (i.e. the variance of the average choice for
each stage) accounted for by the linear, the quadratic and the cubic polynomial,
separately for each condition (Keppel 1973). In the non-communication condition
the linear polynomial accounted for 96 per cent, the quadratic polynomial for 3 per
cent, and the cubic polynomial for 0.7 per cent of the total 'average choice per
stage' variance. In the communication condition, these proportions were 28, 24 and
47 per cent respectively. It was concluded that communication had a levelling effect
on the exploitation of resources during the first stages of decision-making.
In addition to the above analysis of resource choices per stage, the overall effect
of communication and sex was tested by creating as dependent variable the sum of












Figure 7. Average amount of money chosen for self by
stage, separately for males and females in each con-
dition. nc,m = non-communication male; n-c,f =
non-communication female; c,m = communication male;
c,f = communication female
yielded a significant effect for communication (F(1, 128) = 5.41, p < 0.05), and
for sex (F(1, 128) = 4.22, p < 0.05). On the average males chose $1.36 more than
the females did. There was no significant communication by sex interaction effect.
Finally, by means of a Chi-Square test it appeared that there were no distributional
differences in social motives between males and females (x 2(3) = 1.18, n.s.).
Discussion of Experiment 1
The hypothesis that actors with different social motives would make different
resource choices is strongly supported in this experiment. As was predicted,
subjects classified as having a competitive social motivation willingly chose more
for self than the other subjects, and conversely, subjects with an altruistic social
motivation willingly chose less than the average other. The choice behaviour of
individualistic and cooperative subjects also fits the predicted pattern.
Finally, no evidence was found indicating that communication had a differential
effect on subjects having different social motives. The present findings concerning
the effect of communication, seem to support also Festinger's (1953) hypothesis
that pressures toward uniformity among members of a group may occur, because
uniformity is considered desirable, or necessary, in order for the group to achieve
its goal. Further implications of the findings reported above will be discussed in the
General Discussion.
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The existence of sex differences in n-person mixed-motive games has not been
found to be a consistent phenomenon. Caldwell (1976) reported no sex differences
in a five-person Prisoner's Dilemma Game, and Dawes et al. (1977) found that
females were more likely to cooperate in only one of the two Prisoner's Dilemma
experiments conducted. In this experiment, females chose less for self than males.
A tentative conclusion might be that in n-person mixed-motive games, females are
less self interested than males.
EXPERIMENT 2
In Experiment 2, resource choices in the Sequence Dilemma were made in
twenty-person groups. No communication was allowed. Because of the large group
size, some minor changes were introduced in the design of the Sequence Dilemma.
These will be noted in the Procedure section. All the other important parameters,
the number of stages, the range of resource choices on each decision-making stage,
and the average amount of resources expected to be available for each subject,
were identical with those employed in the first experiment.
As noted previously, one can assume that in larger groups persons should feel
less constraint against behaving in a short-term self-interested way. Therefore, it
was predicted that in general subjects in 20-person groups would choose more
money for self than the subjects in the non-communicating 7-person groups. The
hypotheses regarding the relationship between the social motivation of actors and
their choice behaviour in the Sequence Dilemma remain the same.
Method
Subjects
Participants in this experiment were 101 volunteers (58 males; 43 females)
responding to an advertisement in a local newspaper in Groningen, the
Netherlands. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of five groups, each group
consisting of either 19, 20 or 21 persons. If the Sequence Dilemma requirements
were met, subjects received the total amount of money they had chosen for self,
otherwise as in Experiment 1, they received $1.50 per hour.
Procedure for the Sequence Dilemma
Subjects were seated in a 3 x 7 pattern in a large room at a minimal distance of 6 ft
from each other. In order to reduce the amount of calculations during the
experimental task, it was decided to let the subjects select only one out of five
options at each stage of decision-making. All the options involved a certain
consumption of fossil fuels for the heating of water. The five options used in
Experiment 2 were created in such a way that the minimum and the maximum
amount of money the options afford were identical to those employed in
Experiment 1.
There were five fossil fuel pool sizes, each with a probability of 0.2 of being
drawn after all the decisions were made For the earlier 7-person group condition
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(Experiment 1), the middle pool size was $105, which is $15 per subject. In order to
make the pool sizes comparabie between the two experiments, pool sizes were
adjusted in such a way that the middle pool size always equalled 15 times the
number of subjects.
Results
Effects of group size and social motivation
In one of the five decision-making groups the total amount of money chosen across
stages exceeded the highest possible pool size; in the remaining four groups the
average probability of receiving the amount of money chosen was 0.4.
As in Experiment 1 the effect of social motivation on subject's own resource
choices was analysed in a partially hierarchical design. Again, in the final test MS-A
and MS-AB (see Experiment 1) could be pooled with the within-cells estimate of
experimental error. The analysis yielded a significant effect for social motivation
(F(3, 90) = 3.68,p < 0.05). As appears from Tabie 3, the findings of Experiment 1
concerning the effect of social motivation on decision-making in the Sequence
Dilemma were replicated.
The average amount of money chosen for self across subjects and stages is $16.03
(sd = 7.06), which is higher than the average amount chosen in the 7-person
non-communicating groups (M = $14.99, sd = 4.61). Though it was predicted that
subjects in the 20-person groups would choose more money, the difference is not
significant (t(142) = 1.08, separate variance estimates). However, the variability
between the amounts taken for self is significantly higher in the 20-person
condition than in the 7-person non-communicating groups (F(93, 52) = 2.35,
p < 0.05).
Social motivation; relative choice
Using the sum of subject's relative choices as dependent variable, a significant
effect for social motivation was obtained (F(3, 90) = 3.8, p < 0.05). Across stages
competitive subjects chose $5.47 more and individualistic subjects chose $1.48
more than the average other subject in their group (see Figure 8). On the other
hand, cooperative and altruistic subjects chose considerably less than the average
other subject, that is $1.79 and $3.07 respectively. As in Experiment 1, there is no
indication that competitive and to a lesser degree individualistic subjects, were
choosing less than the average other in order to compensate for their excessive
choice behaviour in the beginning of the game.
Table 3. Own resource choices broken down for four classes of social motivation; number
of subjects within parentheses, 20-person groups Experiment 2
Altruistic Cooperative Individualistic Competitive Total
(3 )	 (53)	 (28)	 (10)	 (94)
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Figure 8. Relative choices for four classes of social motivation by
stage in 20-person Sequence Dilemma; comp = competitive, indi =



















Figure 9. Own strategy and expected strategy of others, by stage in 20-person
Sequence Dilemma; broken down for social motive
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Social motivation; relative strategy
Figure 9 shows both subject's own strategy at each stage and subject's expectations
concerning the strategy of others at each stage.
As was expected, at the end of the game, relative strategy data increased for the
classes 'altruism', 'cooperation', 'individualism' and 'competition' respectively. A
one-way analysis of variance on stage 5—relative strategy yielded a significant
effect only for the linear polynomial contrast among the means of the four classes of
social motivation (F(1, 90) = 5.65, p < 0.05). However, contrary to the
expectations and contrary to the results of Experiment 1, the effect of the linear
polynomial contrast among the average stage 1—relative strategies of the four
classes of social motivation was significant (F(1, 90) = 10.67,p < 0.05). A possibie
explanation of this finding is discussed in the General Discussion section.
The accuracy of subject's predictions concerning own and other's resource
choices was analysed by means of the Pearson correlation coefficients between
relative choice and relative strategy. The correlation coefficients increased
gradually from 0.36 (stage 1) to 0.68 (stage 5). As in Experiment 1 it was
concluded that subjects very likely were aware of the differences between their own
resource choices and those of others in their group.
Effects of sex
In order to analyse possible sex effects a 2 x 4 (sex x social motivation) analysis of
variance was carried out on subject's relative choices summed across the five stages.
The analysis yielded a significant effect for sex (F(1, 87) = 9.64, p < 0.05) and for
social motivation (F(3, 87) = 2.81, p < 0.05). There was no significant sex by
social motivation interaction. As in Experiment 1, males chose more for self than
females. It appeared that males chose $2.10 more than the average other group
member while females chose $3.03 less than the average other group member.
Effects per stage
Subject's five resource choices were analysed using a multivariate analysis of
repeated measures with sex as between subjects factor. Besides the multivariate
effect for the linear and quadratic trends (F(2, 91) = < 0.05), only the first
two polynomials had a significant univariate effect. No sex by polynomial
interaction was found. As in Experiment 1 the effect of feedback on subject's
subsequent choice was not significant. The Pearson correlation coefficients were,
stage 2: 0.09; stage 3: 0.03; stage 4: –0.03; stage 5: 0.08.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
One major finding in this study is that, as expected, there is a covariation between
interpersonal differences in social motivation and game behaviour. The game
format used in the present study allows subjects to compare their own behaviour
with that of others, while more information concerning the behaviour of others is
gradually released. It appears that competitively motivated subjects, while
becoming more and more aware of the fact that they take more out of the common
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pool than the others in their group, persist in this behaviour. This obtains both in
the Beven and in the twenty-person groups. Likewise, in both experiments,
individualistic subjects also take more out of the resource pool than the average
other in their group, although not to the degree as competitive ones. Cooperative
and altruistic motivated subjects on the other hand take about the same or less
resources than the average other. Some interesting research questions concerning
the effect of social motive arise. What will be the difference between
decision-making groups consisting of either cooperators or competitors? To which
degree is it possible to influence the subject's motive, and which mechanisms are
capable of accomplishing that? Answers to these questions will hopefully be
provided by future research.
A second finding concerns the relationship between group size and the amount of
resources chosen for self. It appears that, on the one hand, the average amount
taken for self is not significantly greater in the 20-person groups than in the
7-person non-communicating groups. However, on the other hand, the variability
between the amounts taken in the 20-person condition is greater than in the
7-person non-communicating groups. This finding indicates that the exploitative
behaviour of some subjects in the 20-person groups is compensated by the
behaviour of subjects taking only a modest share of the common resources. These
differences between subjects are shown in Table 3 and in Figure 8. Those subjects
taking more than the average other, mainly can be found among the competitively
and individualistic motivated subjects. These data do suggest that, among subjects
with cooperative or altruistic social motives, promoting of the group's welfare at the
cost of one own's economic gain can be found. As Messick (1974) pointed out, in
large group mixed-motive situations, given some concern for the group, the
ultimate deficient outcome for all members can be postponed a long time.
Recently Stroebe and Frey (1982) pointed out that, except in the case of
experimental games, researchers appeared to have had probiems in demonstrating
sizeable effects of an increased group size on the willingness to contribute to a
public good. The findings of the present study indicate that their conclusion may
apply to some experimental games as well. Because the present experimental game
differs from the n-person Prisoner's Dilemmas Stroebe and Frey are referring to, it
seems worthwhile to investigate possible differences between different classes of
experimental games, in their capability to elicit the free-rider effect. In other words,
research on the ecologica) validity of the different classes of experimental n-person
games is warranted.
A third finding concerns the relative strategies of subjects classified as
competitive or cooperative. The pattern of data is not consistent with Kelley and
Stahelski's (1970) triangle hypothesis. Namely, in both experiments, after
information on the behaviour of other's becomes available, competitive subjects do
not assume that others have strategies similar to their own. Rather they continue to
expect differences between their own and others' strategies. Furthermore, there is
no behavioural assimilation of the cooperative subjects to the competitive subjects'
strategy of taking more resources for self than is requested by the average other. It
appears that the specific pattern of expectancies hypothesized by Kelley and
Stahelski to obtain for actors with particular social motives, is not valid for the
game format used in this study.
Part of the present relative strategy findings are more consistent with the
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hypothesis proposed by Kuhlman and Wimberley (1976). They state that subjects
expect most others to hoid social motives similar to themselves. According to this
hypothesis and according to egocentric attribution theory (Ross et al., 1977), when
no information on others' behaviour is available, persons with differing social
motivation assume that the others will be similar to self. Relative strategy data prior
to the first stage decision-making in the Sequence Dilemma, before any feedback,
are relevant to this hypothesis. It appears that in the 7-person groups (Figure 6),
the data are consistent with Kuhlman and Wimberley's hypothesis: between the
four distinguished classes of social motivation there were no significant differences
in first-stage relative strategies. However, the data for the 20-person groups do not
support Kuhlman and Wimberley's hypothesis.
There are two mechanisme that may account for the different first-stage relative
strategy patterns between the 7-person and the 20-person groups. First, in
20-person groups the influence of one person on the group's resources is much
smaller than the corresponding influence in the 7-person groups. Feelings of
responsibility for the common resources, therefore, are expected to be relatively
low in the 20-person groups. Second, though all resource choices remain secret,
feelings of social pressure in 7-person face to face groups are presumably greater
than those feelings in 20-person groups. The joint effect of relatively low
responsibility and low social pressure makes it more likely that, prior to the decisions
for the first stage, a person's intended strategy is considered easier to accomplish in
the 20-person groups than in the 7-person groups. Consequently, differences in
first-stage relative strategies between classes of social motivation, should appear
first in the 20-person groups.
The results of the present study have confirmed that both the triangle hypothesis
and Kuhlman and Wimberley's hypothesis are too restrictive to explain the pattern
of relative strategies and relative choices throughout the decision-making process.
In the present study, it was found that subject's expectations concerning their
relative position in the group, were described more accurately by using a subjective
expected utility maximization model, based on the self—other outcome space. This
result is seen as a conceptual and empirical extension of research concerning the
relationship between own behaviour and expected behaviour of others.
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RÉSUMÉ
Deux expériences ont examiné ]'impact de motifs sociaux et de préférences individuelles
pour des distributions spécifiques de gain (pour soi et autrui) sur le comportement dans des
jeux à n-personnes. Les motifs sociaux des sujets (altruistes, coopératifs, individualistes,
compétitifs) furent évalués avant la prise de décision dans des jeux à 7 personnes (recherche
1) ou à 20 (recherche 2). Une modification par rapport á la procédure normalement
employée dans les jeux à n-personnes a été introduite; elk permettait que les choix effectués
par les joueurs lors d'un essai donné modifient la matrice des gains pour soi et autrui tors des
essais suivants. Le jeu, une simulation de dilemme social, était présenté comme un problème
de conservation de ressources. Dans la première recherche, les possibilités de communiquer
furent manipulées.
Conformément aux prédictions, il y eut des différences consistantes entre les 4 classes de
motivation sociale en ce qui concerne la quantité de ressources prises pour soi: les sujets
compétitifs prirent le plus, les individualistes prirent moins que les compétitifs mais
davantage que la moyenne, tandis que les sujets altruistes et coopératifs prirent le moins. En
outre, les sujets compétitifs s'attendaient à ce que les autres prennent moins de ressources
pour eux qu'ils ne l'ont fait alors que les sujets altruistes s'attendaient à ce qu'ils en prennent
plus. Ces résultats ne sont que partiellement consistants avec les théories actuelles
concernant le rapport entre comportement et comportement attendu de la part d'autrui.
De plus, lorsqu'il était permis de communiquer, les sujets prenaient significativement
moins de ressources pour eux-mêmes. Contrairement aux prédictions basées sur les
recherches antérieures, les sujets dans les groupes de 20 personnes ne prirent pas plus de
ressources pour eux-mêmes que les sujets dans les groupes de 7 personnes.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Zwei n-Personen-Spielexperimente erlaubten, den Einflus der sozialen Motivation oder der
individuellen Bevorzugung von spezifischen Selbst/Andere-Verteilungsergebnisse zu
untersuchen. Die soziale Motivationslage der Vpn (altruistisch, kooperativ, individualistisch,
konkurrierend) wurde vor dem 7-Personenspie] (Experiment 1) und vor dem
20-Personenspiel (Experiment 2) getestet. Der iibliche Ablauf der n-Personen-Spiele wurde
dahingehend verandert dass die Entscheidung der Spieler bei einem gegebenen Versuch die
Gewinn/Verlust matrize fr die folgenden Versucht beeinflusste.
Das Spiel, ein simuliertes Sozialdilemma, wurde als ein Problem der Reservenverwaltung
dargelegt. Im Experiment 1 waren die Kommunikationsmöglichkeiten der Vpn manipuliert.
Wie vorausgesagt, konnten bei der persönlichen Reservenbeanspruchung der vier sozialen
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Motivationsklassen Unterschiede festgestellt werden: konkurrierende Vpn beanspruchten
am meisten, individualistische Vpn beanspruchten weniger als erstere aber mehr als der
Durchschnitt, wiihrend kooperative und altruistische Vpn am wenigsten beanspruchten.
Dazu kommt, das konkurrierende Vpn erwarteten, das die übrigen Vpn die Reserven weniger
beanspruchten und altruistische Vpn nahuren an, dass die ubrigen Vpn die Reserven mehr
beanspruchten als dies tatschlich der Fall war. Diese Resultate sind nur zum Teil im
Einklang mit den gângigen Theorien zur Beziehung von persönlichem Verhalten und dem
erwarteten Verhalten der andern.
Uberdies wurde festgestellt, dass die persönliche Reservenbeanspruchung bei offener
Kommunikationsmöglichkeit signifikant kleiner war. Im Gegensatz zu Voraussagen, die auf
frheren Forschungsergebnissen beruhen, beanspruchten die Vpn im 20-Person-
enexperiment nicht mehr von den Reserven als die Vpn in der 7-Personengruppe.
